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DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF ATTORNEY OPINION WORK
PRODUCT PROVIDED TO AN EXPERT
WITNESS
INTRODUCTION
In the course of preparing his case, an attorney may find it necessary
to show trial preparation materials,I including opinion work product,2 to
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which governs discovery of trial prepa-
ration materials, protects only "documents and tangible things." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Courts have accorded work product protection to a computerized litigation support sys-
tem, see In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. No. 163-RM (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 10, 1975) (available Apr. 3, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), and
diagrams of an accident scene obtained or prepared by a party's attorney, see Scourtes v.
Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Brush v. Harkins, 9
F.R.D. 681, 682 (S.D. Mo. 1950). The work product doctrine does not prohibit a party
from discovering the facts that an attorney has learned. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 511 (1947); In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235,
1240 (5th Cir. 1982); Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 136 (S.D. Ga. 1982);
Casson Constr. Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376, 385 (D. Kan. 1980); 4 J.
Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice 26.6411], at 26-348 (2d ed.
18th printing 1984) [hereinafter cited as Moore's Federal Practice]; 8 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2023, at 194 (1970); see also Illinois v. Borg,
Inc., 95 F.RD. 7, 8 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (facts not immune from discovery even if already
known to party seeking discovery); Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416,
417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (party entitled to discovery of facts in attorney's possession).
Similarly, it does not prohibit discovery of the existence or location of documents, United
States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 45 n. 10 (N.D. Tex. 1979); LaRocca v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1969), or the identity of persons from
whom an attorney has obtained documents, Cedolia v. C.S. Hill Saw Mills, Inc., 41
F.R.D. 524, 527 (D.N.C. 1967) (names and addresses of persons who prepared photo-
graphs, drawings and maps of accident scene discoverable).
This Note will distinguish factual trial preparation material from opinion trial prepara-
tion material. The former will be identified as factual work product and the latter as
opinion work product. The issue whether material is actually opinion work product
within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(3) is a question of fact to be decided by the court. See
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1984) (when ordering produc-
tion of factual work product, trial judge should review documents in camera to guard
against disclosure of opinion work product); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (when or-
dering discovery of factual work product court "shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney"). If opinion
work product and factual work product are embodied in the same document, the docu-
ments should be produced in redacted form in order to prevent disclosure of opinion
work product to an adversary. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
2. For the purposes of this Note, opinion-or core-work product refers to the
"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other rep-
resentative of a party concerning the litigation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). This would
include an attorney's strategy, intended lines of proof, evaluations of strengths and weak-
nesses of his case, and cross-examination plans. Note, Protection of Opinion Work Prod-
uct Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 Va. L. Rev. 333, 333 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Protection of Opinion Work Product]; see, eg., Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947) (witness interview notes); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316
(3d Cir. 1985) (selection and compilation of documents in anticipation of discovery);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 590 (3d Cir. 1984) (attorney's "intellectual
process"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1973) (attorney's
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an expert3 who will testify at trial on the client's behalf. Rule 26(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 (Federal Rules) provides that
materials prepared in anticipation of litigation5 are subject to discovery
by the adverse party, but only upon a showing of substantial need and
personal recollections, notes and memoranda); AI-Rowaishan Establishment Universal
Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 779-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(digest of deposition with marginal notes by attorney); Smedley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53
F.R.D. 591, 593 (D.N.H. 1971) (inter-office memoranda).
Factual work product is "less a matter of creative legal thought and more a mere
recognition of observed fact." Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1146, 1199-1200 (D.S.C. 1974). Unlike opinion work product, factual work product does
not contain an attorney's mental impressions, strategies or legal theories. Factual work
product consists merely of the factual materials obtained by an attorney and the manner
in which such materials are organized. See Note, Waiver of the Work Product Immunity,
1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 953, 959 [hereinafter cited as Waiver of Immunity].
3. An expert witness may be characterized as someone who has "the power to draw
inferences from the facts which a jury would not be competent to draw." C. McCormick,
McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as McCor-
mick on Evidence]; see 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 1923, 1925
(J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978). The Federal Rules of Evidence state that a witness may be
qualified as an expert by virtue of his "scientific, technical, or other specialized . . .
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Fed. R. Evid. 702. Typically, a
witness qualifies as an expert if he has sufficient knowledge of a subject to offer opinions
that are likely to aid the trier of fact. See 7 J. Wigmore, supra, § 1925; see, e.g., Sweet v.
United States, 687 F.2d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1982); Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650
F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1981); Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856, 857-58
(8th Cir. 1975); Stoody Co. v. Royer, 374 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir. 1967) (quoting Re-
statement Model Code of Evidence § 402). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an
expert may give both opinion and nonopinion testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 & advi-
sory committee note.
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides in part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdi-
vision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discov-
ery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
Id. The principles set forth in this Rule collectively form the work product doctrine, first
articulated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). For material to be considered as having been prepared
in "anticipation of litigation," litigation need not actually have been commenced, but the
prospect of litigation must be real and identifiable. See 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra
note 1, $ 26.64[2], at 26-352 to -353; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2024, at
197-98; see, eg., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (some articulable claim must exist); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979) (some possibility of litigation must actually
exist); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 143 (D. Del. 1982) ("mere fact
that a document is prepared before litigation actually commences does not preclude a
finding that it constitutes work product"); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp.
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undue hardship.6 By requiring a significant showing to justify discovery,
136, 151 (D. Del. 1977) (prospect of litigation identifiable because specific claims have
arisen).
Documents prepared in the regular course of business are not protected by the work
product doctrine. See APL Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 91 F.R.D. 10, 14-15 (D.
Md. 1980) (investigative report prepared by insurance company); Soeder v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 90 F.R1D. 253, 255 (D. Nev. 1980) (corporation's internal report prepared
shortly after aircraft accident); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54
F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (N.D. M11. 1972) (documents prepared by insurance underwriter's sur-
veyor); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 1, § 2024, at 199; Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection Not Privilege, 71
Geo. L.J. 917, 925-29 (1983); see also United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1040-41
(7th Cir. 1973) (documents prepared by accountant advising taxpayer are discoverable).
The protection accorded opinion work product is not limited solely to materials pre-
pared by an attorney. Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party's
representative "including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent"
are also immunized. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). This Note is concerned only with trial
preparation materials that are provided by an attorney to an expert witness. It will not
examine the problems attendant on the discovery of material prepared by an expert wit-
ness for an attorney, which is governed by Rule 26(b)(4).
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The district courts have broad discretion in determining
whether substantial need and undue hardship has been shown. See In re International
Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693"T.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir. 1982); Southern Ry. v.
Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72
F.R.D. 640, 644 (S.D. Ga. 1976); 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, Ir 26.64[3.-1],
at 26-362. A mere showing that material is relevant to a party's case is insullicent to
compel discovery. See id. 26.64[3.-1], at 26-362 to -363. To compel discovery under the
substantial need and undue hardship standard, a party must demonstrate that the materi-
als are important to his case and that he cannot obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials elsewhere. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note
1, 26.64[3.-1], at 26-362; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2025, at 224-25;
Note, Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work Product Protection
Under the Federal Rules, 88 Yale L.J. 390, 397 & n.46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mem-
ory Refreshment Doctrine].
Substantial need and undue hardship have been shown when witnesses are no longer
available. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1979)
(witness deceased); McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 473-74 (4th Cir. 1972) (amnesia
victim entitled to statements taken by defendant's insurer); In re Grand Jury Subpoena,
81 F.R.D. 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (witness refused to testify unless granted immunity,
hence unavailable to government); Teribery v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 68 F.R.D. 46, 47-48
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (only known living witness unable to remember certain facts); Xerox
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (witnesses unable to remem-
ber who in defendant's employ had access to trade secrets). Substantial need and undue
hardship have also been shown when information is in the exclusive possession of one
party. See, eg., Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 1981) (defend-
ant's test results to establish plaintiff's claim in patent infringement action); Galambus v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 64 F.R.D. 468, 473 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (photographs
taken immediately after accident); Rackers v. Siegfried, 54 F.R.D. 24, 26 (W.D. Mo.
1971) (precise measurements and diagrams of accident scene). Statements taken contem-
poraneously with or shortly after an accident have been held to be unique, see, eg.,
Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 1, § 2025, at 220-21, and hence subject to discovery under the substantial need
and undue hardship standard, cf. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 128-29 (5th
Cir. 1968) (statements taken shortly after accident subject to discovery under then-ex-
isting good cause standard) (quoting Johnson v. Ford, 35 F.R.D. 347, 350 (D. Colo.
1964)); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2025, at 220-24.
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Rule 26(b)(3) in effect furnishes the attorney with "a zone of privacy"7 in
which to prepare his client's case. The Rule further provides that in or-
dering such discovery the court shall guard against disclosure of opinion
work product-notably the mental impressions, thought processes, opin-
ions and legal theories of counsel.' Thus, Rule 26(b)(3) accords attorney
work product a qualified immunity from discovery9 that rises to a virtual
absolute immunity for opinion work product.10
When opinion work product is shown to an expert witness in prepara-
tion for trial, however, the policies underlying this immunity come into
conflict with the policies embodied in the liberal discovery of Rule
26(b)(4).11 Promulgated to allow for broader discovery of facts known
7. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir.
1980); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864
(D.C. Cir. 1980); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142-43 (D. Dcl.
1982); see, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 1984); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de
Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
510-12 (1947) (witness interview notes and opinion work product not discoverable). Ex-
amination of the issue whether work product immunity can be invoked only by the attor-
ney or by both the attorney and his client is beyond the scope of this Note.
8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See supra note 4.
9. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); Augenti v. Cappellini, 84
F.R.D. 73, 80 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Arney v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 53 F.R.D. 179, 180 (D.
Minn. 1971) (mem.); Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (N.D. Ga. 1968);
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2025, at 211-12; Cohn, supra note 5, at 929;
Waiver of Immunity, supra note 2, at 956.
10. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (extraordinary
showing required for discovery of opinion work product); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (opinion work product discoverable only in "special
circumstances"); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) (opinion work product
entitled to near absolute protection); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note
("[t]he courts have steadfastly safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers' mental impres-
sions and legal theories"); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 (1981)
("Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses' oral statements is
particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney's mental processes."); cf.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947) (witness interview notes discoverable only
in "rare situations"). Some courts have gone so far as to hold that opinion work product
is in fact entitled to absolute protection. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). In pertinent part, this Rule provides:
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable
under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to iden-
tify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and
to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected
to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the
court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions
as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule,
concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
Fed. R, Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Rule 26(b)(4) was intended to overcome obstacles to discovery
of the identity, findings and underlying data of expert witnesses. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4) advisory committee note; Fed. R. Evid. 705 advisory committee note. Rule
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and opinions held by trial experts,' 2 Rule 26(b)(4) provides that a party
may discover the identity of experts designated as trial witnesses 3 to-
gether with the basis and substance of the expert witness' opinion.' 4 Fur-
ther discovery may be obtained upon motion.' The Rule has been
interpreted as depriving the expert witness' findings of the immunity
granted to attorney work product.' 6 Under Rule 26(b)(4), therefore, a
party may theoretically seek to compel production of the opinion work
product that Rule 26(b)(3) counsels the courts to protect.
To ask whether opinion work product shown to an expert witness
should be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4) is another way of asking
whether and under what circumstances opinion work product should be
absolutely immune from discovery. Some courts have held that opinion
work product is entitled to absolute immunity from discovery in all situa-
tions;' 7 by inference, this would also include 26(b)(4) discovery requests.
26(b)(4) "allows considerable discovery of information obtained by experts." 8 C. Wright
& A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2029, at 241; see Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101
F.R.D. 301, 303-04 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Herbst v. IT&T Corp., 65 F.R.D 528, 530-31 (D.
Conn. 1975); United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 371 (F.D. Mich.
1971).
12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Rule 26(b)(4)(A) distinguishes between experts ex-
pected to be called as trial witnesses, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i), and experts uti-
lized in anticipation of litigation but who are not expected to testify, see Fed. . Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(B). Facts known or opinions held by the latter may be discovered "upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seek-
ing discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." Id. Facts
and opinions may also be discovered pursuant to Rule 35(b), which governs discovery of
reports prepared by a physician following a court-ordered medical examination of a
party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b). This Note will be limited to an examination of the
interaction of Rules 26(b)(3) and (b)(4) only as it pertains to experts designated as trial
witnesses.
13. See Fed. . Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)i).
14. See id.
15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). Discovery under this Rule is intended to be
accomplished through interrogatories before further discovery by other means may be
sought. See Norfin, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 532 (D. Colo. 1977); Herbst v.
IT&T Corp., 65 F.R1D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1975); United States v. John R.-Piquette
Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 372 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Fed. . Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)); 4 Moore's
Federal Practice, supra note 1, 26.66[3], at 26411 to -413.
16. See Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 98 F.I.D. 740, 742 (E.D. Mo. 1983);
In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 74 F.R.D. 594, 595 n.1 (D. Conn. 1977); Fed. . Civ.
P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2029, at
243; Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. Il. L.F. 895, 901-02.
17. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 733-34
(4th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473
F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 96 F.R.D. 64, 68 (N.D.
Ill. 1982); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976); United
States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.RD. 640, 643 n.3 (S.D. Ga. 1976); United States v.
Booth, 399 F. Supp. 975, 978 n.l (D.S.C. 1975); Teribery v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 68 F.R.D.
46, 47 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Smedley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 591, 593 (D.N.H.
1971); 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, 26.64[3.-2], at 26-383 to -389; Cohn,
supra note 5, at 932-34; Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 337-41. In
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Other courts entertain a very limited exception for this immunity that
would permit discovery of opinion work product only when that material
relates directly to a crime or fraud"8 or is itself at issue.19 Like the first
view, this view would not subject opinion work product to (b)(4) discov-
ery.2° Still other courts employ a balancing test in deciding whether
opinion work product is discoverable;2" because discovery is ordered
largely at the judge's discretion, this could conceivably result in discov-
ery of opinion work product under (b)(4). Another view holds that the
immunity accorded opinion work product is qualified and may be
waived.2" Under this fourth view, disclosure of opinion work product to
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a far
stronger showing than substantial need and undue hardship was required to compel pro-
duction of opinion work product, but declined to decide whether opinion work product
was absolutely immune from discovery. See id. at 401-02.
18. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Doe, 662
F.2d 1073, 1079-80 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326, 336 n.19 (8th Cir. 1977); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D.
706, 709 (W.D. Mo. 1978); see also Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at
341-45 (crime or fraud exception maintains integrity of judicial system).
19. See 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, 1 26.64[3.-2], at 26-385; Waiver of
Immunity, supra note 2, at 960; see, e.g., Byers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436, 438-40
(D.D.C. 1983) (production of opinion work product required to determine whether stat-
ute of limitations on attorney malpractice claim had expired); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 931-33 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (good faith of defendants in main-
taining prior litigatiqn at issue); Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66
F.R.D. 129, 133-36 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (mem.) (activites of counsel in underlying lawsuit
basis for defense); Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (party
interposed advice of counsel as reason for not rescinding contract); see also Protection of
Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 341-45 ("at issue" exception furthers ultimate
goals of judicial system).
20. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 593-95 (3d Cir. 1984). See supra
note 18.
21. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970),
affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971); Xerox Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); IT&T Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60
F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973). In United Tel. Co., the court concluded that opinion work
product is entitled to greater protection than factual work product, see 60 F.R.D. at 186-
87, but did not specify what showing was necessary to compel discovery of opinion work
product, see id. In Harper & Row Publishers, the court, in holding that opinion work
product was not discoverable, concluded that "the less the lawyer's 'mental processes' are
involved, the less will be the burden to show good cause." 423 F.2d at 492. The court in
Xerox Corp., found itself confronted with a situation in which factual work product and
opinion work product were intertwined. See 64 F.R.D. at 381-82. The court concluded
that if a "distillation" of the factual from the opinion work product was impossible, the
entire document must be produced. See id.
The problem with a balancing approach is that it fails to provide guidance to the pro-
fession as to what is and is not protected. If such an approach were widely followed, it
would inhibit attorneys from recording opinion work product, thus hindering in-
dependant trial preparation. See Waiver of Immunity, supra note 2, at 960-61; Protection
of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 344-45.
22. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (participation
in SEC's voluntary disclosure program constitutes waiver); Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D.
404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983) (showing opinion work product to expert witness constitutes
waiver); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239-40 & n.14 (1975) (using
witness interview notes to discredit witnesses at trial constitutes waiver of notes' protcc-
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an expert amounts to a waiver, so that (b)(4) discovery would be accom-
plished despite (b)(3) constraints.'
The approach that is most consistent with the policies behind Rules
26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) is one that would protect opinion work product
from Rule 26(b)(3) discovery requests in all but a few narrowly defined
circumstances, and that would protect opinion work product from Rule
26(b)(4) discovery requests at all times.24 This interpretation elevates the
protection afforded by Rule 26(b)(3) over the liberal discovery embodied
in Rule 26(b)(4). This Note therefore concludes that opinion work prod-
uct utilized by an expert witness in preparation for trial should be abso-
lutely immune from discovery under Rule 26(b)(4). Part I of this Note
analyzes the language, history and purpose of Rules 26(b)(3) and
26(b)(4) and concludes that according opinion work product absolute
immunity from a Rule 26(b)(4) discovery request is not inconsistent with
the policies underlying either rule. Part II discusses various theories of
waiver of work product immunity and concludes that they are either in-
correct or inapposite to the issue at hand.
I. OPINION WORK PRODUCT ENTITLED To NEAR ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY
A. Origin and Language of Rule 26(b)(3)
The history and policies underlying Rule 26(b)(3) make opinion work
product discoverable only in rare and narrowly defined circumstances.
The Rule is essentially a codification of the Supreme Court's decision in
Hickman v. Taylor.25 In that case, the Court upheld a refusal by defend-
ant's counsel to produce notes taken during interviews of witnesses who
had testified at an earlier public hearing.26 The Supreme Court, ac-
knowledging a lawyer's need for privacy in order to prepare his client's
tion as opinion work product); cf. James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 146
(D. Del. 1982) (showing binder of documents containing documents effected waiver of
factual work product immunity under Fed. R. Evid. 612); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (factual work product immunity
found to be waived under Fed. R. Evid. 612, but court declined to order discovery be-
cause that Rule only recently adopted).
23. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983).
24. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984). That court
concluded that the value of using opinion work product to cross-examine an expert wit-
ness did "not warrant overriding the strong policy against disclosure of documents con-
sisting of core attorney's work product." Id. This approach essentially applies to Rule
26(b)(4) discovery requests the general rule set forth in the second view, which recognizes
only the crime, fraud and "at issue" exceptions to the otherwise absolute immunity ac-
corded to opinion work product. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. For the
purposes of this Note, the phrase "absolute immunity" will be used only when discussing
the protection from Rule 26(b)(4) discovery enjoyed by opinion work product. When
discussing the opinion work product protections in terms of other discovery requests, the
expression "near absolute immunity" will be used.
25. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
26. See id. at 509.
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case properly, 27 made clear that interview notes and writings reflecting
the attorney's mental impressions, conclusions or legal theories are enti-
tled to broad if not absolute protection from discovery. 28 The Court
observed: "Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an at-
torney."' 29 The Hickman Court reasoned that an attorney must be able to
plan his strategy and outline his legal theories without undue
interference.3 °
Rule 26(b)(3) was adopted to implement the Hickman principle of
broad immunity from discovery for opinion work product.3' As noted
above, the substantial showing required for disclosure of factual work
product 32 is enhanced for opinion work product:33 When ordering dis-
covery of trial preparation materials, "the court shall protect against dis-
closure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litiga-
tion."' 34 This language indicates that something more than a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship is required to compel discovery of
this special type of work product.35 To many courts this protection rises
almost to the level of absolute immunity that should not be abrogated
27. See id. at 510-11.
28. Id. at 511; see FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2209, 2212-13 (1983); Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399-400 (1981); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587,
592 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Mur-
phy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de
Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
29. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947); accord In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073,
1077 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
473 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir. 1973); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150
(D. Del. 1977).
30. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. The Court observed: "Proper preparation of a
client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the rele-
vant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
undue and needless interference." Id. at 511.
31. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 1984); Dixon v. Cappellini, 88 F.R.D. 1, 3 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (mem.); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150 (D. Del. 1977); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note; 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1,
26.64[3.-2], at 26-382; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2026, at 230-32; Cohn,
supra note 5, at 932; Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 336-37.
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
34. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
35. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809-10 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage
et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997
(1975); A1-Rowaishan Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Nye v. Sage Prods., Inc., 98
F.R.D. 452, 454 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (mem.) (possible prejudice resulting from selective pro-
duction of privileged documents creates sufficient showing for production of factual work
product, but protection still accorded opinion work product).
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even when the policies of another rule may conflict.36
It could be argued, however, that the liberal discovery principles of
Rule 26(b)(4) take precedence over the protections afforded by Rule
26(b)(3). The first sentence of Rule 26(b)(3) indicates that the discovery
rules contained therein are "subject to" the provisions of Rule
26(b)(4),37 which provides the exclusive mechanism for the discovery of
facts known and opinions held by an expert witness.38 Because the basis
of an expert witness' findings is often derived from the factual work prod-
uct shown to him by the attorney, arguably the practical effect of this
"subject to" provision is to make such work product discoverable with-
out any showing of substantial need and undue hardship.39 Thus, the
protection provided by Rule 26(b)(3) for factual work product necessar-
ily yields to Rule 26(b)(4)'s broad discovery rule.'
The "subject to" provision, however, does not pertain to, and therefore
does not limit the effect of, the second sentence, which requires courts to
provide heightened protection for opinion work product when factual
trial preparation materials are produced.4" The second sentence operates
independently of the "subject to" provision. As an outgrowth of the
Hickman doctrine, it exempts opinion work product from the discovery
permitted in the first sentence,42 however accomplished. As written, the
Rule implies a two step process in ordering discovery of trial preparation
materials: First, the party seeking discovery must satisfy the require-
ments of Rule 26(b)(3)'s first sentence-the substantial need/undue
hardship standard or the more flexible rules of Rule 26(b)(4)-as appro-
36. See, eg., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 594 (3d Cir. 1984) (produc-
tion of opinion work product pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4) denied); Al-Rowaishan Establish-
ment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (production of opinion work product pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 612
denied); Clower v. Walters, 51 F.R.D. 288, 289 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (production pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) denied); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 47
F.R.D. 334, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (production pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 denied); cf.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1947) (production of opinion work product
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (now 26(b)(1)) denied).
37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See supra note 4.
38. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Graham, supra note 16, at 926.
39. See Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F.
Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y 1983); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig.,
77 F.R.D 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 74 F.R.D. 594,
595 n.1 (D. Conn. 1977); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note (deci-
sions bringing expert's information within work product doctrine rejected as "ill-consid-
ered"). But see Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 97 (V.D. Mo. 1983) (substantial
need and undue hardship standard applied to discovery of factual work product shown to
expert).
40. See Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F.
Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig.,
77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 74 F.R.D. 594,
595 n.1 (D. Conn. 1977); Graham, supra note 16, at 926.
41. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 594 (3d Cir. 1984).
42. See id.
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priate;43 second, the court must prevent disclosure of opinion work prod-
uct among the materials sought and obtained. There is no suggestion in
the language of Rule 26(b) that would call for abandoning the heightened
protection that Rule 26(b)(3) provides for opinion work product." Ac-
cordingly, opinion work product-shielded by Rule 26(b)(3)-would not
be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4). This conclusion is reinforced by the
policies underlying both rules.45
B. Policy Considerations of Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4)
1. Policy of Heightened Protection: Rule 26(b)(3)
The practice of according opinion work product shown to an expert
witness absolute immunity from 26(b)(4) discovery follows directly from
the greater principle that opinion work product should be protected from
disclosure in all but a few exceptional circumstances. Recognizing these
exceptions is necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the adversary
system,46 which requires each attorney to prepare his case fully47 and
without undue interference.4" While a trial should be a search for truth
rather than a "battle of wits" between counsel,49 the federal discovery
rules were not intended "to enable a learned profession to perform its
functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.""0
The Hickman Court recognized that a lawyer needs privacy to prepare
43. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (court's obligation to protect opinion work arises
"when the required showing [for discovery of factual work product] has been made").
44. See id. See supra notes 4, 11.
45. See infra notes 46-66, 84-94 and accompanying text.
46. See Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 335; see also United
States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (purpose of work product
doctrine is to promote adversary system); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Dep't
of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
997 (1975); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142-43 (D. Del. 1982)
(same); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150-51 (D. Del. 1977) (same).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1975); Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980);
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150 (D. Del. 1977); In re Federal
Copper, Inc., 19 Bankr. 177, 182 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)
advisory committee note.
48. See Cohn, supra note 5, at 919-20; Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note
2, at 334; see, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236-38 (1975); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d
Cir. 1984) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1077 (4th
Cir. 1981) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage ct
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 997 (1975).
49. See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2001, at 14 (prior to adoption of
federal discovery rules, "judicial proceeding was a battle of wits rather than a search for
the truth").
50. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
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his client's case properly."1
The work product doctrine seeks to promote an atmosphere in which
counsel can prepare their clients' cases "without the stifling self-editing
that would be necessary if an attorney's work product was subject to
unchecked discovery."' 2 These policies apply with even greater force to
opinion work product." Compelling an attorney to reveal his innermost
thoughts or legal theories would frustrate the goals of the adversary sys-
tem by forcing an attorney to provide materials incorporating his reason-
ing and ideas to his opponent. 4
The Court in Hickman also concluded that an immunity for work
product was necessary to maintain the ethical standards of the legal pro-
fession. 5 If an attorney could not prepare for litigation in privacy, "[ain
attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Ineffi-
ciency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial."' 6 With-
out an immunity for work product, situations could arise in which the
attorney would in effect be a witness or would have his credibility placed
in question.5 7 Counsel would also be reluctant to take written notes,
5 8
51. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947); Cohn, supra note 5, at 943; see,
e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1981); United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1975); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir.
1984) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8,
1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1973).
52. Cohn, supra note 5, at 943; see, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073,
1077 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); United States v. AT&T Co., 642
F.2d 1285, 1299 (4th Cir. 1980); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. United States Dep't of
Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chava-
noz, 509 F.2d 730, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); Fed. L Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory
committee note; Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 335.
54. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516-17 (1947) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 333-34 (8th Cir. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavanoz, 487 F.2d 480, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1973); Handgards, Inc. v. John-
son & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon
Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 33 (D. Md. 1974); Cohn, supra note 5, at 919-20; Protection of
Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 335. There are situations where an attorney may
be required to divulge work product to his adversary. For example, when an attorney
uses factual work product to refresh a witness' recollection he may be compelled to dis-
close the material by Fed. R. Evid. 612. Such an approach, however, should not be
applied when discovery of opinion work product is sought. See infra notes 108-19 and
accompanying text.
55. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
56. Id.; accord FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2209, 2213 (1983); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237
(1975); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Doe, 662 F.2d
1073, 1077-78 (4th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re Special Sept. 1978
Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980).
57. The Hickman Court reasoned:
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thus placing greater dependence on memory. 9 Furthermore, broad dis-
covery of work product might discourage complete preparation and first-
hand investigation.'
The protections ensured by opinion work product immunity cannot be
achieved by any other safeguard. The attorney-client privilege is inade-
quate because it protects only confidential communications between the
attorney and his client6 l and does not pertain to information that an at-
torney acquires from agents or his own investigation.' Moreover, it
Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that
witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary gives rise to
grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is
served by such production. The practice forces the attorney to testify as to
what he remembers or what he saw fit to write down regarding witnesses' re-
marks. Such testimony could not qualify as evidence; and to use it for impeach-
ment or corroborative purposes would make the attorney much less an officer of
the court and much more an ordinary witness. The standards of the profession
would thereby suffer.
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512-13; see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231
(3d Cir. 1979) (discovery of interview memoranda risks converting attorney from advo-
cate to witness); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516-17 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (if
attorney was compelled to produce notes of witness interviews, adversary might be able
to use them to impeach witness, thus placing attorney's credibility in question).
58. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (if discovery of opinion work
product were allowed, "much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwrit-
ten"); FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2209, 2213 (1983) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at
511); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237 (1975) (same).
59. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th
Cir. 1974) (if attorneys cannot freely record opinion work product, "truth. . . will be-
come lost in the murky recesses of the memory in the minds of men"), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 997 (1975).
60. See United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also
Cohn, supra note 5, at 919-20 (discovery of opinion work product would cause attorneys
to rely on adversary's work); Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 335
(same).
61. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); In re
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. AT&T Co., 642
F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49,
62 (7th Cir. 1980). The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine protect
different interests. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-98; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508; Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d at 808-09; AT&TCo., 642 F.2d at 1299; 1978 Grand Jury (1), 640 F.2d at
62; McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, § 87, at 204-06; 4 Moore's Federal Practice,
supra note 1, 26.60[2], at 26-189 to -193; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2024,
at 210. As one court observed:.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full disclosure of
information between an attorney and his client by guarantying the inviolability
of their confidential communications. The "work product of the attorney," on
the other hand, is accorded protection for the purpose of preserving our adver-
sary system of litigation by assuring an attorney that his private files shall, ex-
cept in unusual circumstances, remain free from encroachments of opposing
counsel.
Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
62. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (attorney-client privilege
does not extend to opinion work product); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808-09 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (information other than attorney-client communications not protected by at-
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may be invoked only by the client or the client's attorney or agent on his
behalf.63 Finally, the attorney-client privilege is subject to strict waiver
rules" that, if broadly construed,65 might sanction discovery of confiden-
tial work product without regard for Rule 26(b)(3)'s equally compelling
policy interests discouraging disclosure. 66 For these reasons, the attor-
ney-client privilege would serve to protect only a fraction of the litigation
materials vital to the effective prosecution of a claim. Unless opinion
work product shown to expert witnesses is absolutely immune from Rule
26(b)(4) discovery, it would be improperly vulnerable to disclosure.
It has been argued that allowing an adversary access to opinion work
product is necessary for impeachment or rebuttal-in order, for example,
to challenge the origin or validity of the expert's opinion. 6' Discovery of
an attorney's mental impressions and theories, is, however, a needlessly
intrusive means of accomplishing these goals, particularly because Rule
26(b)(4) allows for liberal discovery of the facts underlying the expert's
opinion" to impeach or cross-examine that expert.69 Access to these
torney-elient privilege); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th
Cir. 1980) (same); Brown v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 96 F.R.D. 64, 68 (N.D. Il1 1982)
(attorney-client privilege does not extend to information secured by attorney from wit-
nesses acting on behalf of client); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 80 F.R.D.
706, 709 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (attorney-client privilege does not protect factual information
discovered by attorney); Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44,47 (N.D. Cal.
1971) (documents obtained from third persons not privileged); 8 C Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 1, § 2017, at 137-38 (attorney-client privilege does not extend to information
and statements attorney obtains from third persons).
63. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 915 (1979); United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1979), cert
denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556
(2d Cir. 1967); McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, § 92, at 221; 4 Moore's Federal
Practice, supra note 1, 26.6414], at 26-390.
64. Because the attorney-client privilege applies only to confidential attorney-cient
communications, see supra note 61, voluntary disclosure to a third person destroys the
privilege. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Weil v. Invest-
ment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Bump, 605
F.2d 548, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1979); Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486
F. Supp. 1328, 1331-32 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F.
Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp.
1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C. 1974); McCormick on Evidence, supra note 3, § 93 at 223; 4
Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, 1 26.60[2], at 26-201; Waiver of Immunity, supra
note 2, at 964.
65. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 725 n.7 (N.D. M. 1978);
Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977); Ceco Steel Prod.
Corp. v. H.K. Porter Co., 31 F.R.D. 142, 143 (N.D. MI1. 1962).
67. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J.,
dissenting); Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407-08 (D. Colo. 1983); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note ("The lawyer even with the help of his own
experts frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's expert will
take or the data on which he will base his judgment ... . [E]ffective rebuttal requires
advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side.") (citations omitted).
68. See United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370, 371 (E.D. Mich.
1971); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, 26.66[3], at
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facts is sufficient for effective impeachment. Acquisition of the attorney's
opinions and theories from which the expert's opinion was derived would
contribute little of significance and hence would be unnecessary.! 0
Rule 26(b)(4) vests the trial court with broad discretion to order ex-
pansive discovery of an expert's findings.71 Under Rule 26(b)(4), a court
should permit discovery of all relevant and nonprivileged material if
there is no unfairness to the party from whom discovery is sought.72 Ar-
guably, disallowing discovery of opinion work product provided to an
expert frustrates the purposes of Rule 26(b)(4).73 However, an adverse
26-416 to -417; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2029, at 240-41. Neither Rule
26(b)(4) nor the advisory committee notes indicate what, if any, standard of need the
party seeking discovery under that Rule must meet. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) & advi-
sory committee notes; Graham, supra note 16, at 923. Several early cases denied addi-
tional, noninterrogatory discovery, after imposing a high standard of need for the party
seeking discovery. See, eg., Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (N.D.
Miss. 1972) (requiring unique and exceptional circumstances); United States v. 145.31
Acres of Land, 54 F.R.D. 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (compelling need); Wilson v. Res-
nick, 51 F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (same), affd mem., 485 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.
1973). These decisions improperly disregard both the principle of broad discovery em-
bodied in the Federal Rules, see, eg., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947);
Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1983); FDIC v. Mer-
cantile Nat'l Bank, 84 F.R.D. 345, 348 (N.D. Ill. 1979), and the advisory committee note,
which repudiated decisions holding that the expert's information was protected by the
work product doctrine, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
Most cases have construed Rule 26(b)(4) liberally and therefore do not require a show-
ing of substantial need and undue hardship. See, e.g., Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy &
Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Dennis v.
BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303-04 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re IBM Peripheral EDP
Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 41-42 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Quadrini v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Div., 74 F.R.D. 594, 595 (D. Conn. 1977); Herbst v. IT&T Corp., 65 F.R.D.
528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1975); 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, 1 26.6613], at 26-
416.
69. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil. Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984); United States
v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory
committee note; 4 Moore's Federal Practice, supra note 1, $ 26.66[3], at 26410 to -411; 8
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2030, at 251. As the court in Bogosian observed:
The thrust of Rule 26(b)(4) is to permit discovery of facts known or opinions
held by the expert. Examination and cross-examination of the expert can be
comprehensive and effective on the relevent issue of the basis for an expert's
opinion without an inquiry into the lawyer's role in assisting with the formula-
tion of the theory.
Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595.
70. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984).
71. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee note (courts have broad powers of
discovery when materials are sought under Rule 26(b)); Connors, A New Look at an Old
Concern-Protecting Expert Information From Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 18
Duq. L. Rev. 271, 272 (1980) ("in this area of the law very much is left to the whim,
sometimes called 'discretion' of each particular judge").
72. See, e-g., Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303-04 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Oglivy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
1013, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326, 333 (D.R.I.
1976); Herbst v. IT&T Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1975); Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4) advisory committee note. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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party having broad access to the facts and data used by the expert in
reaching his conclusion would have little need of or justification for seek-
ing production of opinion work product.
It could also be argued that it is relevant to the fact finder's assessment
of the expert's credibility whether the expert's opinion originated with
the attorney or with the expert himself.74 If the expert's findings are
debatable or flawed, however, an attorney who has the factual basis for
these findings at his disposal should be sufficiently equipped to identify
the flaw and cross-examine the expert accordingly. Conversely, if the
expert's conclusions are valid, the need for opinion work product to re-
but or impeach the expert does not justify intrusion into an attorney's
opinion work product. Even if the attorney originated the idea, the ex-
pert, by testifying to it at trial, in effect subscribes to or ratifies it, thereby
giving the idea the same weight as if the expert had formulated it himself.
Moreover, under Federal Rule of Evidence 705, the attorney cross-exam-
ining the expert can inquire into the origins of the expert's opinion.75
Therefore, the fact that the expert's findings or theories originated in
whole or in part with the attorney will be revealed on cross-examination,
thus obviating the need to discover documents constituting opinion work
product.
In sum, the need to obtain disclosure of opinion work product for the
purpose of cross-examining the expert does not outweigh the competing
need to protect that material from intrusive discovery.76 Thus, granting
opinion work product immunity from discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)
strikes an effective balance between the need to preserve the integrity of
the adversary system and the policy of liberal discovery upon which the
Federal Rules are premised.
If opinion work product is discoverable at all, its disclosure should be
limited to narrow and well defined circumstances." Some courts have
recognized exceptions for crime or fraud7" or when the opinion work
product itself is at issue.79 These exceptions to opinion work product
immunity are concerned with maintaining the integrity of the judicial
74. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
75. See id. (Becker, J., dissenting). Fed. R. Evid. 705 provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Id. Arguably, examination into the the facts underlying the expert's opinion may also
include inquiries into the origin of that opinion. Because of Rule 26(b)(4) the cross-
examining attorney will have sufficient access to factual material forming the expert's
opinion to be able to make an inquiry into any role an attorney may have played in
formulating the expert's opinion.
76. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984).
77. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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system:80 In each case discovery is necessary for the purpose of proving
a claim or presenting a defense.8 Discovery in those situations in no
way subverts the policies favoring absolute immunity for opinion work
product shown to expert witnesses when these narrow concerns are not
at issue;82 therefore, neither doctrine should operate to impair the other.
Absolute immunity for opinion work product shown to expert witnesses
as a general rule is therefore not inconsistent with the common law ex-
ceptions that have developed around it.
Finally, failure to protect opinion work product that is shown to an
expert may discourage attorneys from using experts in presenting their
clients' cases. This may have significant adverse effects on the presenta-
tion of the client's case, particularly in actions when expert testimony
goes to the heart of the issue.8 3
2. Policy of Broad Discovery: Rule 26(b)(4)
Rule 26(b)(4) affords adverse counsel liberal discovery privileges to ob-
tain material shown to experts in anticipation of trial.8 4 Prior to the
adoption of Rule 26(b)(4), a variety of theories were advanced for deny-
ing discovery of an expert witness' findings and the underlying factual
basis for them. Some courts had held that an expert's findings were pro-
80. See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Doe, 662 F.2d
1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d
326, 335 (8th Cir. 1977); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 931-
33 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Protection of Opinion Work Product, supra note 2, at 343-45.
81. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (opinion work
product not protected if attorney's work performed in furtherance of crime, fraud or
"other misconduct inconsistent with the basic premises of the adversary system"); In re
Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981) (work product immunity "not designed as a
fringe benefit for protecting lawyers who would, for their personal advantage, abuse it"),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp.
926, 931-33 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (discovery of opinion work product necessary when party is
asserting reliance on attorney's advice); Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 66 F.R.D. 129, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (mem.) (discovery of opinion work product
essential when activities of counsel in underlying action formed basis for defense in cur-
rent action); Bird v. Penn Cent. Co., 61 F.R.D. 43, 46-47 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (discovery of
opinion work product required when essential to other party's case). See supra note 18.
82. It could also be argued that in the situation where an attorney participates in a
crime or fraud, the interest of manitaining the integrity of the judicial system outweighs
the need for protecting the attorney's work product.
83. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; see, e.g., Weiss v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (expert testimony "crucial" to resolve
products liability dispute); Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (expert testimony needed to resolve wrongful death action arising from alleged
manufacturing defect); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45,
52 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (testimony of damages expert crucial); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft
Div., 74 F.R.D. 594, 594 (D. Conn. 1977) (parties in highly technical lawsuit relying
extensively on expert testimony); United States v. NYSCO Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D.
159, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (expert scientific testimony crucial in action to enjoin introduc-
tion of drug into interstate commerce); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del. 1959) (adequacy of procedures used by experts
crucial in patent infringement case).
84. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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tected by the attorney-client privilege.8 5 Other courts, reasoning that the
expert was an agent of the attorney, held that the expert witness' findings
were protected by Hickman's work product immunity doctrine.86 Still
other courts developed and applied an "unfairness" doctrine to justify
denying discovery of expert witnesses.87 Courts relying on this doctrine
denied discovery when they were convinced that it would be unfair to
allow one party to benefit from the expertise of an expert retained by the
other party, particularly when the party seeking discovery can procure
its own expert testimony. 8
85. See, e.g., Schuyler v. United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (ex-
pert report obtained after commencement of litigation privileged whether obtained by
attorney or client); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 684, 686-
87 (D. Mass. 1947) (expert is agent of party so findings are protected by attorney-client
privilege); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940)
(expert not required to divulge any communications between himself and attorney or
client). This view is difficult to sustain in light of the Court's conclusion in Hickman that
"the protective cloak of this [attorney-client] privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of
litigation." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); see 4 Moore's Federal Practice,
supra note 1, 26.66[1], at 26-405; Note, Discovery of Expers; A Historical Problem and a
Proposed FRCP Solution, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 785, 795-97 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dis-
covery of Experts].
86. See Discovery of Experts, supra note 85, at 794-95; see, e.g., Carpenter-Trant Drill-
ing Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257, 260-61 (D. Neb. 1959); Scourtes v.
Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Colden v. RJ. Scho-
field Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952). This approach was expressly re-
jected by the drafters of the rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
One problem with this view is that the expert's findings, unlike those of other agents,
constitute evidence. See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert In-
formation, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 479 (1962); Graham, supra note 16, at 901; Discovery of
Experts, supra note 85, at 795-96. Additionally, a major policy consideration underlying
the work product doctrine is to avoid situations in which the attorney in effect becomes a
witness. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Concealing the expert witness find-
ings under the cloak of the work product doctrine does not serve this function because
the expert is a proper witness. See Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 39 Wash. L. Rev. 665, 691 (1964); Discovery of Experts, supra note 85,
at 796.
87. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note; Graham, supra note 16, at
902-03; see, e.g., United States v. 2,001.10 Acres of Land, 48 F.R.D. 305, 308 (N.D. Ga.
1969) (not unfair to deny discovery of expert's reports until party seeking discovery has
prepared own reports); United States v. 5 Cases, 9 F.R.D. 81, 83 (D. Conn. 1949) (dis-
covery of expert's report denied, party seeking discovery could conduct own tests), aff'd,
179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594, 596 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (court should not allow one party
to prove its case through use of an expert paid for by the other party); Boynton v. RJ.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass 1941) (mere offer of compensation
by opposing party to expert not sufficient to compel discovery of expert witness). Other
courts denied discovery of an expert's findings because it would be unfair to the expert.
See Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378-79 (D.NJ. 1954) (fair to deny
discovery of expert witness' report because he had property right in it); United States v.
Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 234-35 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (same).
88. See, eg., United Air Lines v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213,217-18 (D. Del. 1960);
Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378-79 (D.NJ. 1954); Colonial Airlines v.
Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6
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Rule 26(b)(4) was adopted to end this confusion.89 In drafting the
Rule, the Advisory Committee acknowledged that a lawyer requires ad-
vance preparation in order to cross-examine an expert witness effectively
for the purpose of rebutting his findings. 90 It expressly rejected the hold-
ing that an expert witness' findings were protected by the work product
doctrine. 9' Rule 26(b)(4) in effect codified the unfairness doctrine.92
Under this Rule, all nonprivileged and relevant materials that an expert
witness used in preparing his findings may be discovered, 93 thus facilitat-
ing the effective cross-examination and impeachment of that expert. Ac-
cordingly, because extensive factual materials are already available to the
opposing party, there would be no need to order production of opinion
work product shown to an expert witness. 9
4
II. THEORIES OF WAIVER INAPPOSITE
Rule 26(b)(4) does not provide the courts with any standards to use in
F.R.D. 594, 596 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Boynton v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp.
593, 595 (D. Mass. 1941).
Decisions prior to the adoption of Rule 26(b)(4) also relied on a variety of other theo-
-ries in denying discovery. Under one view, the expert witness' information was regarded
as the property of the expert or the litigant employing him. See Graham, supra note 16,
at 902; see, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co. 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954) (expert
had property interest in his own expert conclusions); United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 235 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (appraiser had property right in report).
Another view maintained that it is unfair for one party to have the benefit of the ex-
pert's knowledge without paying for it. See United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32
F.R.D. 593, 597 (D. Md. 1963); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note. Rule
26(b)(4)(C) provides:
Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the party
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii)
with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule
the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision
(b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay
the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by
the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C). Discovery may not be automatically obtained, however,
merely by offering to pay the expert's fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) advisory
committe note; cf Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D.
Mass. 1941) (pre-rule case; court denied discovery even though adversary offered to pay
expert witness' fee). Some courts, however, had held that there were situations in which
granting discovery of expert witnesses was not unfair. See, e.g., United States v. 2,001.10
Acres of Land, 48 F.R.D. 305, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (not unfair to exchange reports once
each party had prepared their own); United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593,
597 (D. Md. 1963) (not unfair to grant discovery of expert witness because opposing
party will pay).
89. See Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326, 332 (D.R.I. 1976); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 1, § 2029, at 249-50; Graham, supra note 16, at 898-99.
90. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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determining whether further discovery of an expert witness should be
ordered.95 Courts attempting to resolve discovery disputes involving
opinion work product shown to an expert might be tempted to analogize
to waiver theories applicable to the attorney-client privilege or Federal
Rule of Evidence 612.96 These approaches fail to appreciate the overrid-
ing importance of maintaining the integrity of opinion work product in
our adversary system.97
A. Mere Disclosure of Opinion Work Product To A Third Party Does
Not Waive The Immunity
Cases that have held that mere disclosure of work product to third
persons constitutes a waiver of work product immunity9" tend to confuse
the work product doctrine with the attorney-client privilege. 99 The work
product immunity is broader than and encompasses the attorney-client
privilege."°° Because the work product doctrine and the attorney-client
privilege serve different purposes,"' the waiver rules of one should not
apply to the other." 2 It would thus be inappropriate to rely on attorney-
client waiver principles to strip opinion work product shown to experts
of its immunity.
Courts that recognize the different policies underlying the work prod-
uct doctrine have adopted a "common interest" test to respond to discov-
ery requests.' 0 3 This test dictates that work product immunity is not
waived when the work product is shown to someone with a common
interest in the litigation."° It would be waived only when disclosure to a
95. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
96. In Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983), the court relied on Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (disclosure of
work product to expert witness effects waiver of work product immunity under Federal
Rule of Evidence 612) to hold that disclosure of opinion work product to an expert wit-
ness waives the immunity. Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 407. See infra notes 111-19 and accom-
panying text.
97. See supra notes 46-53 and infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Schenectady Chems., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 19 Fed. L Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1132, 1133 (N.D.N.Y. 1975); D'Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610,
610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464-65
(E.D. Mich. 1954); Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
99. See 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 1, § 2024, at 209-10.
100. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n. 11 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re
Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 801 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979); see also United States v. AT&T Co.,
642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (disclosure made in course of trial preparation does
not waive work product immunity). See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.RD. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); American Standard
Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 446-47 (W.D. Mo. 1976); 4 Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, supra note 1, 26.64[4], at 26-390 to -392; Waiver of Immunity, supra note 2, at 965.
104. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); GAF
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third person substantially increases the likelihood that the work product
will fall into the adversary's hands.0'0 As one court observed:
The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect information
against opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a partic-
ular confidential relationship, in order to encourage effective trial prep-
aration. . . . A disclosure made in the pursuit of . . . trial
preparation, and not inconsistent with maintaining secrecy against op-
ponents, should be allowed without waiver of the privilege. We con-
clude, then, that while the mere showing of a voluntary disclosure to a
third person will generally suffice to show waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, it should not suffice in itself for waiver of the work product
privilege. 106
It follows, therefore, that opinion work product-traditionally entitled
to even greater protections than factual work product-should be simi-
larly immune from third-party waiver principles. Showing opinion work
product to an expert is often indispensable to the effective preparation
and prosecution of a client's case. Moreover, disclosure to an expert, like
disclosure to a co-defendant or co-plaintiff, does not increase the likeli-
hood that the work product will be revealed to the adversary. 107 There-
fore, the common interest doctrine should similarly apply to opinion
work product shown to experts. Indeed, applying the strict waiver rules
of the attorney-client privilege to attorney work product would compro-
mise an attorney's ability to prepare the best case possible for his client,
and would adopt an unduly rigid approach to dangers that are more
speculative than real.
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); American Standard,
Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 447 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1984) (disclosure of opinion work product to expert
does not constitute a waiver of the immunity). There is some disagreement among the
courts, however, in deciding who is a party with a common interest. Compare D'Ippolito
v. Cities Serv. Co., 39 F.R.D. 610, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Justice Department and plaintiff
held not parties with common interest because government not party to plaintiff's anti-
trust suit) with United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299-300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(Justice Department held to be party with common interest under similar facts).
105. See United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); GAF
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 85 F.R.D. 46, 51-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); American Standard,
Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 71 F.R.D. 443, 446 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 1, § 2024, at 210; Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 Minn. L. Rev.
1269, 1299-300 n.100 (1969); Waiver of Immunity, supra note 2, at 966.
106. United States v. AT&T Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emphasis in
original).
107. In Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984), both the district and
circuit courts held that showing opinion work product to an expert witness did not con-
stitute a waiver of the opinion work product immunity. See id. at 593. This reasoning is
correct because the expert witness shares a common interest with the litigant and the
attorney in the effective presentation of the litigant's case. Showing opinion work product
to the expert in no way enhances the likelihood of immunized materials falling into the
hands of the adversary. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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B. Waiver Under Federal Rule of Evidence 612 is Inapposite
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 provides that an adversary may, by or-
der of the court, obtain the written materials used by a witness to refresh
his recollection.1"8 It could be contended that because Rule 26(b)(4)
does not provide any guidance to courts in determining whether to grant
further discovery,"°9 the principles of Rule 612 should be applied by
analogy."' Whatever value this analogy holds for discovery of factual
work product, it is not persuasive when opinion work product is sought.
In Berkey Photo, Inc v. Eastman Kodak Co.,11 the district court held
that work product immunity is waived when factual work product is
used to refresh an expert witness' recollection."1 2 That court feared that
parties would conceal discoverable materials under the guise of trial
preparation. 1 3 The automatic waiver rule espoused by Berkey,114 how-
ever, ignores the principles of Rule 26(b)(3) and has the effect of compel-
ling discovery without a showing of any need at all, let alone substantial
need and undue hardship. 5 Although there is an obvious unfairness in
108. Fed. R. Evid. 612 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings by section 3500 of title
18, United States Code, if a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the
purpose of testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in
the interest of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence
those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness ...
Id.
109. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
110. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983).
111. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
112. See id. at 617. The court, however, did not order production of the material at
issue because the Federal Rules of Evidence had been adopted too recently to have al-
lowed counsel to anticipate that they were waiving their work product immuity. See id.
113. See id. at 616-17.
114. The Berkey rule has been applied in several subsequent cases. See S & A Painting
Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.RtD. 407,409 (W.D. Pa. 1984); James Julian, Inc. v. Ray-
theon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 145 (D. Del. 1982); Peck & Peck, Inc. v. Jack La Lane Fifth
Ave. Health Spa, Inc., No. 76-4020 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1978) (available Apr. 2, 1985, on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). A similar result was reached in Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972), which was decided before the memory refreshment
doctrine was codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 612. See id. at 13.
115. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 612[04], at 612-41 to -42
(1981); see Memory Refreshment Doctrine, supra note 6, at 401-02. Weinstein and Berger
observe:
[A]utomatic disclosure whenever a witness prepares himself for a deposition by
referring to pertinent materials may lead to the the very practice which troubled
the Hickman court. . . . The opponent should be required to make some
showing of need in order to obtain materials which a witness reviewed before a
deposition instead of achieving wholesale disclosure.
3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, q 612[04], at 612-41 to -42; See also S & A Painting
Co. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407, 409 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (since disclosure of attorney
work product under Fed. R. Evid. 612 circumvents substantial need/undue hardship
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allowing a party to use ordinary trial preparation materials to refresh a
witness' recollection and then to refuse to allow his adversary to view the
documents to check for their accuracy, it would be even more unfair to
use the pretext of Rule 612 to strip opinion work product of the protec-
tions assured by Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3). As one court observed,
"[T]he purposes of Rule 612 are generally fully served without disclosure
of core work product."' 16 As a rule, therefore, an attorney's mental im-
pressions should be free from discovery under 612 and its attendant
waiver doctrine "[u]nless the judge finds that the adverse party would be
hampered in testing the accuracy of the witness' testimony." 1 7 In any
case, to preserve the sanctity of these documents, such a determination
should be made by an in camera review of the materials in question, with
the court weighing the importance of the confidentiality of opinion work
product against the substantiality of the adverse party's need. 1" In any
event, if disclosure is warranted, opinion work product should be
redacted. 119
CONCLUSION
A rule prohibiting disclosure of opinion work product sought under
Rule 26(b)(4) better effectuates the policies underlying the work product
doctrine. The facts that the expert used in reaching his findings are read-
ily discoverable. The limited impeachment value opinion work product
may have is outweighed by the attorney's need to prepare his client's case
in private. Since Hickman v. Taylor, documents comprising an attor-
ney's core or opinion work product have been accorded a virtually sacro-
sanct status. This status is required if the soundness of our adversary
system is to be maintained. Moreover, since Hickman, "the Supreme
Court has never permitted intrusion into work product revealing the at-
torney's thought processes." 120 Accordingly, providing opinion work
standard, Rule will be narrowly construed to only compel discovery of portions of docu-
ments actually used to refresh recollection.
116. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984). But see id.
(Becker, J., dissenting) (majority's holding in conflict with Federal Rule of Evidence
612).
117. Al-Rowaishan Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra note 115, 1 612[04], at 612-40). In Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1984), the
court declined to resolve whether opinion work product provided a witness must be pro-
duced under Fed. R. Evid. 612. Id. at 318 n.7. The court held that Rule 612 was inappli-
cable because the party seeking disclosure failed to show the documents had an impact on
the witness' testimony. Id. at 318-19.
118. See AI-Rowaishan Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (after in camera review, court held
that documents in question should not be produced); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 115, 1 612[04], at 612-40 (judge should examine documents in camera and refrain
from producing opinion work product).
119. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note; 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra note 111, 612[04], at 612-41 to -42.
120. Id. at 612-40.
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product absolute protection from discovery under Rule 26(b)(4) most ef-
fectively achieves this goal while not impairing the policy of liberal dis-
covery embodied in the Federal Rules.
Bryan Lewis

